Abstract-S-boxes are used in cryptography in order to provide non-linearity in the design of cryptographic primitives such as block ciphers and hash functions. Some cryptographic primitives use bijective S-boxes as in the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), and others use surjective S-boxes as in the Data Encryption Standard (DES). That is, S-boxes can have inputs and outputs of the same length as in the (8,8)-S-box of AES, or alternatively the input length can be larger than the output as in the (6, 4)-S boxes of DES. In this paper, we perform a statistical study of linear and differential properties of randomly generated (n, m)-S-boxes, where m:::; n. We show that certain S-boxes with well-behaved linear and differential properties can be feasibly obtained via random search. We show further that certain types of S-boxes with specific desirable linear and differential properties are improbable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic communications nowadays make use of cryptographic primitives in order to provide confiden tiality of the information being transmitted. Shanon in his seminal paper [1] highlighted two important concepts required to design any cryptographic primitive, namely, confusion and diffusion. Confusion means to provide a relationship between the plaintext, ciphertext and key that is as complex as possible. It is achieved nowadays with the use of nonlinear components in the design, such as S boxes. Diffusion, on the other hand, means to spread out the relationship between these bits as fast as possible, which, for example, can be achieved via the use of MDS (Maximum Distance Separable) [2] and Pseudo Hadamard Transform [3] matrices.
S-boxes are crucial components of many cryptographic primitives. If such components are removed, these prim itives can be easily broken by performing linear analysis to the inputs, outputs and the secret key assuming that other components are nonlinear. The secret key bits can then be easily deduced from the input and output bits using certain linear algebra methods like the Gaussian elimination. Therefore, it is essential that the S-boxes used in any cryptographic primitive are nonlinear and very well crafted against linear attacks.
The well-known block cipher AES uses a bijective S box of 8 bits length for both input and output [4] , while the DES block cipher uses 8 surjective S-boxes of 6
978-1-908320/73/5/$31.00 © 2016 IEEE and 4 bits length for input and output, respectively [5] . Most other cryptographic primitives use either type of these S-boxes. For example, the PRESENT cipher uses bijective S-boxes of length 4 bits [6] and the hash function KECCAK uses a bijective S-box of length 5 bits [7] .
In this paper, we investigate the linear and differen tial properties of bijective and surjective S-boxes. The procedure we follow is based on randomly generating a large number of S-boxes of a specific size, and then testing their individual linear and differential indicators (see section III for formal definitions). Then, we return the best S-box generated so far with regard to these two measures. We also perform a statistical analysis of the S-boxes' linear and differential properties. These two measures are used to thwart linear attacks (and their generalizations) of Matsui [8] and differential attacks of Biham and Shamir [9] . The linear indicator is intended to measure the linearity of an S-box (the lower this value, the better its resistance to linear attacks). The differential indicator, on the other hand, is meant to measure the resistance of an S-box to differential attacks and their generalizations (the lower this value, the better its resistance to differential attacks). In block ciphers, many rounds (of cryptographically weak functions) are used in order to improve the overall performance of the cipher against both linear and differential attacks. The choice of the number of rounds is based on a compromise between speed and security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the related work. Notations and methodology are presented in section Ill. Section IV presents the analysis on a generated DES-like S-boxes (that is (6, 4) S-boxes in a specific form) and their differential and linear properties. Section V presents the analysis on randomly generated bijective (where n = m) and surjective (where n > m) (n, m )-S-boxes, and their differential and linear properties. Section VI discusses future enhancements of our analysis and ideas to generalize to other types of S boxes followed by the conclusion in Section VII. We provide most supplementary figures and tables in the appendix.
RELATED WORKS
The linear and differential attacks are first proposed by Matsui in [8] , and Biham and Shamir in [9] , re spec- Also in [11] , the author studied the distribution of the DES-like (6, 4)-S-boxes with respect to all the design criteria imposed on these S-boxes of DES as described in [12] . The additional restrictions imposed on these (6, 4) S-boxes are made to be consistent with the other compo nents of the design of DES. The author however did not study in general the behaviour of linear and differential properties of such (6, 4 )-S-boxes without these additional restrictive constraints.
In this paper, we extend the analysis of a prior work in [13] to several classes of (n, m)-S-boxes with respect to the most powerful linear and differential attacks. The results in this paper can assist the designers of cryptographic primitives in choosing the best (n, m )-S boxes based on our empirical studies. We assume that the designers can carefully choose the other components which provide diffusion properties. The optimal com ponents with respect to diffusion is well known in the cryptographic literature: the usage of MDS and pseudo Hadamard matrices as in the design of the AES [4] , Khazad [14] , ARIA [15] and Anubis [16] to name a few.
Ill. NOTATIONS AND METHODOLOGY

A. Notations
In this subsection, we present standard metrics and notations that are widely adopted in cryptanalyzing any block cipher, and specifically S-boxes [17] . We denote an Definition m.l (Linear Indicator). The linear indicator of an (n, m) -S-box S(x) is denoted by '\(S) and is defined as: (u, v) E IF� x IF� is defined as the discrete Fourier transform:
A related term which is also used widely in the literature is the nonlinearity of an (n, m )-function, which is defined as:
Definition ID.3 (Nonlinearity). The non linearity of any (n, m) -S-box S(x) is:
The quantity £ma x (S) � maxvEIF2'* ,uEIF2'I Ws(u,v) 1
is often called the linearity of an (n, m)-S-box S(x). It is easy to show that the linear indicator of an (n, m) S-box is related to the nonlinearity and linearity by the following two relations:
Additionally, to measure the differential property of any S-box, we have the following common indicator which we refer to as the differential uniformity:
Definition m.4 (Differential Uniformity). The dif f eren tial uniformity of an (n, m) -S-box S(x) is denoted by O(S) and is defined as:
When o(S) = 2 which is the rrummum possible when working in IF�, we call such an S-box almost perfect nonlinear (APN). When o(S) = d, we call it dif f erentially d-uniform S-box. As a general defensive mechanism against linear and differential attacks, the designer has to keep the values of '\(S) and o(S) as low as possible. These measures or their equivalents are often used in the literature to assess the resistance against linear and differential attacks for any block cipher. For example in the AES block cipher, the designers made sure that '\(S) and o(S) are as low as possible by the use of certain mathematical techniques to construct such S-boxes [4, 18] . In this paper, we sometimes write 0 and ,\ to denote respectively O(S) and '\(S) whenever S is clear from the context.
B. Random Generation of (n, m) -S-boxes
We randomly generate an (n, m)-S-boxes (where n 2: m) by random permutation according to the Knuth's shuffle which guarantees the uniformity of the random generation [19] . This procedure is presented in Algo rithm 1 to obtain a random (n, m )-S-box for n 2: m.
(In our implementation, we used the standard randO function in the C library, seeded by time milliseconds.) The uniformity of the random generation helps to expand the search space. It is observed that the randO function behaves almost uniformly. If this was not the case, one would end up generating similar S-boxes which will shrink down the search space. Besides, this algorithm does not require a cryptographically secure random num ber generator which is a much harder task to implement than uniformly distributed random number generator. The time complexity of this algorithm is 0(2n). However, since n is a small constant (� 8) in our analysis, the running time is 0(1).
Algorithm 1 RANDOMGENERATESBOX
Require: Number of input bits n; Number of output bits m
Take a random number j such that 0 � j � 2n -2
4:
Swap S(i) and S(i + j)
5: end for
8: end for
The general mechanism we apply to analyze the ran domly generated (n, m)-S-boxes can be summarized as follows. We first generate a random (n, m )-S-box accord ing to Algorithm 1. Then, we compute the linear indicator
A(S) and differential indicator O(S) of this S-box S(x).
Before generating another (n, m )-S-box, we record the values of the visited differential and linear indicators, i.e.
(O,A), in a two dimensional array counter, denoted by C( 0, A). Also, we keep the S-box values for the best found S-box so far in a table called Sbest(X). This is shown in Algorithm 2 below.
The time complexity of the two methods used to compute o(S) and A(S) can be performed in 0(22n) and 0(n2n+m), respectively. The corresponding memory space complexity can be performed in 0(2m) and 0(2n), respectively. Thus, the total time complexity of this algorithm is 0(Tn2n+m) and space complexity is 0(2n) (notice that n � m). Since n and m are constants, the actual memory complexity is 0(1) and time complexity is O(T).
D. Experiment Setup
In our experiments, we generated over 1 million ran dom S-boxes. Each S-box is tested by computing its dif ferential uniformity and linear indicator. We implemented all tests using C programming language compiled with 978-1-908320/73/5/$31.00 © 2016 IEEE Algorithm 2 RANDOMSEARCH Require: Number of input bits n; Number of output bits m; Number of S-boxes to be generated and tested T Ensure: The best random (n, m)-S-box Sbest(X) with respect to o(S) and A(S); two dimensional counter C( 0, A) for these two indicators 1: Create an empty S-box Sbest(X) with 0 = 2n and A = 2n 2: Create a two dimensional counter C(o, A) with all entries initially set to zero Compute O(S) and A(S) 6:
end if 10: end for 11: return Sbest(X) and C(o, A) "-03" optull lzation flag . A well optimized C imple mentation generally obtains far better running time than any other high level programming language. Additionally, since our basic operations are addition and multiplication, it is preferable to have a self-contained implementation with a good degree of simplicity rather than using off the-shelf computer algebra software (e.g., Mathematica , PARUGP . The testing was performed on a machine of a 64-bit bus, an Intel dual-core processor of 1.66 GHz each and a RAM memory of 1 GB. It was run on a Linux operating system version 2.6.34 and GCC compiler version 4.2.4.
IV. ENHANCED ANALYSIS OF THE RANDOMLY GENERATED DES-LIKE (6, 4)-S-BOXES AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION
In this section, we present our enhanced analysis of the linear and differential parameters on the random DES-like (6, 4)-S-boxes which we have generated using Knuth's Shuffle method using a similar algorithm as Algorithm 1. The difference between DES-like (6, 4)-S-boxes and general (6, 4)-S-boxes being that DES-like (6, 4)-S-boxes are a specific type of all (6, 4)-S-boxes. In [10], DES-like (6, 4)-S-boxes are called composite permutations.
A. Distribution of the DES-like S-boxes in terms of their Linear and Dif f erential Indicators
We present the distribution of these linear indicator and differential uniformity in Fig.2 . The first and second subfigures present the distribution of 0 and A respectively, while the third subfigure presents the joint distribution. The frequency histogram data is provided in Table I . We note that we did not get values for the differential uniformity higher than 30 and for the linear indicator lower than 10. It is important to keep in mind that for :::
• . ,"
. .
. . a linear or almost linear S-box, it is natural obtain higher values for the differential uniformity and linear indicator. This is because a linear S-box always has a maximum linear indicator and differential uniformity by definition. 
B. The Best and Worst DES-like (6 , 4) -S-boxes
The highest J we have obtained is 30 and the lowest one is 12. For A, the highest A is 24 and the lowest A is 10. Therefore, the best S-box (i.e. with the lowest A and J together) is with J = 12 and A = 10. And the worst S-Box (i.e. with the highest A and J together) is with J = 28 and A = 20 or when J = 26 and A = 22. We keep only the best (6, 4)-S-box found with respect to the differential uniformity and linear indicator together. This is shown in ) when converted to a decimal number selects which column we take from that corresponding row.
We point out that DES-like (6, 4)-S-boxes generated in this test, as shown for example in Table 11 , is slightly dif ferent from the (6, 4)-S-boxes generated in the test we did in Table- of the more general class of (6, 4)-S-boxes. That is why we see some slight differences in the two distributions corresponding to these two classes. Therefore, it can be deduced further that the real DES (6, 4)-S-boxes, which have even more restrictions than this one, has even a different distribution. This observation can be verified further with the results of Roelse in [11] .
We note that certain types of DES-like (6, 4)-S-boxes
with particular values of J and A pairs occur more frequently than others in our random search. The most frequent type of these randomly generated DES-like Table Ill . For comparison, we have also shown in Table IV the differential uniformity and linear indicator of the eight (6, 4)-S-boxes used in the standard DES block cipher. 
SURJECTIVE (n, m)-S-BOXES
In this section, we extend our analysis of the linear and differential parameters to more general (n, m )-S-boxes, where n;::: m.
A. Analysis of (4, m) oS-boxes
We provide the distributions of three (4, m )-S-boxes, mE {2, 3, 4} in the three tables in Appendix A. Observe that we did not obtain any S-boxes with differential uniformity of 14. This observation does not directly affect the problem of choosing good S-boxes since a differential uniformity of 14 is a bad choice cryptographically. We also know from [20] that a bijective APN (4, 4)-function does not exist by exhaustively testing out all of these bijective (4, 4)-functions.
We also know in theory that bent (4, 2)-functions exist and have a differential uniformity of 4 [21] ; however, they are not balanced. Also, it is well known that dif ferentially 6-uniform (4, 2)-functions exist as shown in [22] . However, it is not known whether all differentially 6-uniform (4, 2)-functions are unbalanced or if there exist some balanced instances. 
B. Analysis of (5 , m) -S-boxes
In this category of S-boxes, we observed that when m decreases, the linear indicator values decrease and the differential uniformity increases. (This trend is even clearer for (7 , m)-S-boxes as shown in the appendix.) We know from [22] that differentially 6-uniform (5 ,3) functions exist but it is not known whether all of them are balanced or not. From Table- Another important observation from these tables is that in Table-(5,1) and Table- [22] . We know also that balanced APN (5, 5)-S-boxes exist within this category as with Gold [23] , Kasami [24] , Welch [25] , Niho [26] , Inverse [18] and Dobbertin [27] (5, 5)-S-boxes. We also observe that Boolean (5 , 1 )-S-boxes have a differential uniformity always divisible by 4. This observation is also visible for the (7, 1 )-S-boxes as well. Whether this behaviour is specific to these Boolean (n, 1 )-S-boxes or applies more generally is an interesting theoretical open question on its own.
In Fig.2 , we plot the linear indicator versus the number of corresponding (7 , l)-S-boxes. In other words, we plot the RSum of Table-(7,1) from Appendix D. This proba bility distribution mimics that of a Gamma probability distribution for some mean and spread factor (can be easily obtains by standard distribution fitting tools for each case). In Fig.2 , we plot the differential uniformity versus the number of corresponding (7, 1 )-S-boxes, which we refer to by CSum in Table-( 
VI. DISCUSSION
In order to improve our analysis, we propose the following enhancements to be done on our testing proce dures and the following generalizations for our analysis as well. First, testing more random S-boxes will give better insight into what can be done to improve the quality of any chosen (n, m)-S-boxes in the design phase of block ciphers and hash functions. By testing more S boxes, we may get more insights into what is possible and impossible for the extreme low values of the differential uniformity and linear indicator of these S-boxes when � < m < n for n is even and when m < n when n is odd. one can even improve the generation process of the (n, m )-S-boxes by enumerating all (n, m )-S-boxes and testing them against linear and differential parameters. Even though the method we are using does not generate much repetition of S-boxes, the enumeration approach will give more certain results even though it will hardly cover the whole search space of all (n, m )-S-boxes.
Secondly, the random search approach we have used in Algorithm 2 can be improved to search for targeted (n, m )-S-boxes with a specific low value of differential uniformity o(S). If in the computation process of O(S) we get a single value which is higher than our targeted o(S) we abort from testing that particular S-box. This procedure will save much time which can be used to test other random (n, m )-S-boxes. As it can be observed from all the tables and figures we have, targeting a particular o (S) is much better for saving time than targeting a particular )'(S) because O(S) has a distribution which has more variation in values than that of )'(S).
Additionally, one can implement the additional criteria of the actual (6, 4)-S-boxes of DES mentioned in [12] in order to eliminate many of the randomly generated S-boxes as undesirable and cryptanalyze the remaining ones. This would produce an efficient elimination and sieving procedure for such a large number of possible S boxes. However, one should be careful with such a choice because the design criteria imposed in [12] in order to be made compatible with other components of DES such as the permutation and expansion functions. In other words, if we replace the other components of DES with other permutation and expansion functions (which constitute for the diffusion properties in DES), we need also to replace these design criteria with other compatible ones. Additionally, DES was designed long before the invention of MDS matrices which in turn give the best diffusion properties possible.
VII. CONCLUSION
AES and DES S-boxes are not randomly selected but were tested against many cryptanalysis attacks taken into consideration at the design stages. However, at that time when DES was designed their S-boxes were chosen to thwart differential attacks but not all types of linear attacks as stated by Coppersmith in [12] . Coppersmith also mentioned that they have designed DES S-boxes to avoid other attacks as well which are not covered in our cryptanalysis here. AES on the other hand has been selected to withstand both linear and differential attacks. Additionally, our cryptanalysis based on linear and differential characteristics provides a very essential tool for generating randomly and testing bijective (n, m) S-boxes, as in AES, and surjective (n, m )-S-boxes, as in DES. We have seen that the linear and differential properties for these types of S-boxes follow a certain joint probability distribution that mimics the Gamma distribution. We also hope that our analysis can stimulate more research in proving the existence or in-existence of certain types of surjective (n, m )-S-boxes.
ApPENDIX
We list the linear and differential indicators of (n, m) S-boxes where m :s; nand n ranges from 4 to 8. We use here RSum for the sum of the values in that row (here corresponds to a particular linear indicator .\) and CSum for the sum of values in that corresponding column (here for a particular differential uniformity 5).
A. Tables of (4, m )-S-boxes
Joint Distribution of ), and 8 of (4, 4 loS-boxes ), \ 8 
